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Significant attention has been paid recently to the importance attached by the Attlee 
governments (1945-51) to the modernisation of British industry. Despite its social and 
economic importance, however, the construction sector remains largely an enigma within 
this enquiry.  Yet, contextually, the perception of the building industry as uniquely 
‗backward‘ was widely shared and transmitted by senior politicians and civil servants, the 
research community and the ‗modern‘ architectural movement.  Within the dualistic 
strategy of short-term stabilisation and raising industrial productivity, rescuing the 
building industry from its ‗mediaeval‘ ways was deemed essential.  ‗Low productivity in 
building [as the major investment goods industry], especially when productivity 
elsewhere is rising‘, argued the government‘s Central Economic Planning Staff (CEPS) in 
1949, ‗is a very major factor in the present tendency for full employment to slip from time 
to time into inflation.‘ As a consequence, capital investment planning, about which 
ministers likewise enthused, was also closely tied to building productivity levels.2  
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In pursuing supply-side solutions for improving national productivity, it is argued, 
Labour rejected enforced structural change on private industry in favour of a tripartite co-
operative framework, an extension of the ‗democratic‘ approach brokered by the state 
during the war to help raise productivity.3  Where formal controls were retained beyond 
the post-war emergency period it was not for the ‗long-term development of industry, but 
rather to achieve short-term management of the economy‘.4  Nor was this, revisionists 
argue, a time of consensus. Little agreement existed over industrial policy inside 
parliament, or between employers and trade unionists.5  It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that Labour‘s approach to modernisation proved problematic, for the combined macro, 
micro and political constraints were ‗formidable‘.6  
As a social and economic priority, heavily reliant on public spending, and as the 
candidate thought to be in greatest need, the building industry offers a ready litmus test 
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for Labour‘s commitment to a consensual restructuring of the private sector in a hostile 
environment.  Yet whether a tangible ‗backwardness‘ in construction existed outside of a 
spun political, scientific and architectural rhetoric remains questionable. Contemporaries 
certainly disagreed strongly in their diagnoses and over the remedial action necessary.  
Doubts were apparent, too, as to what exactly constituted ‗up-to-date‘ methods in an 
industry noted for its lack of congruity with factory-based manufacturing.  Taken 
together, this begs the question as to whether antithetical judgements on the industry‘s 
resistance to change were more prejudicial than factual.  Employers, particularly, inclined 
to this view, and sought consistently to place clear water between an acknowledged post-
war productivity shortfall and any broader structural failure.  Lack of clarity, however, 
left undiminished a political determination to modernise the industry.  Whether this was 
driven more by contextual expediencies than economic merit clearly warrants 
investigation. 
 
 
I 
 
Low output in construction has largely been associated with the small amounts, 
comparatively, of fixed capital able to be employed per worker. Thus, in 1951 on average 
gross capital stock in manufacturing stood at £1,420 per capita, but in construction it was 
only £220.
7
   Contemporary capital formation levels (Table 1) place construction in no 
more favourable a light.  This is true even if investment in new premises is discounted as 
being inappropriate to the industry‘s mode of production. Incorporated within is the  
 
Table 1 Annual Gross Capital Formation Building and Manufacturing at 1951 prices  
 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1957 1960 1965 
Manufacturing           
Total £  293m 341m 410m 519m 610m 622m 669m 1253m 1370m 2177m 
Per capita  All fixed assets £ 37.70 42.90 50.40 62.40 74.40 74.70 78.20 143.10 152.20 238.20 
Ditto plant & vehicles  £ 27.70 32.10 37.90 48.60 57.30 57.90 60.10 102.10 115.40 188.80 
           
Building           
Total £ 19m 21m 23m 33m 40m 39m 51m 75m 88m 219m 
Per capita  All fixed assets £ 12.70 14.30 15.40 22.20 26.70 26.30 33.40 47.20 53.90 114.50 
Ditto plant & vehicles  £ 11.30 13.10 13.30 18.80 24.00 22.10 28.20 39.90 48.80 103.30 
Sources: National Income and Expenditure (1963 & 1974); Feinstein, op.cit. (footnote 7). 
 
association that the building industry remained essentially ‗pre-industrially‘ orientated. 
Such was the linear authority of perceived ‗backwardness‘ that even as industrialised 
building and investment expanded rapidly into the 1960s, construction was still being 
characterised historically as: being ‗notable for its slow [technical] development‘, where 
site methods had changed ‗only to a limited extent‘, with some mechanisation and 
prefabrication, leaving the building crafts ‗little affected.‘8  Such  judgements are not 
uncontested.  It is argued that inter-industries comparisons with construction are 
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inappropriate, and/or that the ‗problem of mechanisation‘ has been mis-specified.9  
Clarke, instead of ‗fetishizing‘ on construction‘s lack of a factory comparable 
manufacturing and assembly system, selects as her measuring criteria the inter-related 
complexity of the combined off and on site building process, and the advanced social 
productive form this requires.10  Ball identifies the applicability of Taylorism and Fordism 
as the defining crux of the ‗backwardness-because-of-physical-constraints‘ thesis.  Even 
the latter principles, he posits, are implicit within good site management practice: so that 
‗the plan of work takes the place of the production line in determining the pace‘, as labour 
and plant flow continually and repetitively from one task to the next.  ‗All that can be said 
empirically‘, he concludes, ‗is that building work is different from other productive 
activities and uses considerable amounts of labour‘.11  
Broadening the criteria, however, offers no immediate clarity.  It only begs further 
questions of contemporary diffusion, measurable comparability and contextual location: 
ignoring, for example, the questionable desirability of the British adoption of American 
manufacturing methodology, or, rhetoric aside, the limited degrees to which scientific 
management was accepted by British industry generally in the immediate post-war 
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‗modernising‘ period.12   When asking if, in fact, the building industry was backward, and 
how best may this be measured, the Building Research Station (BRS) concluded: ‗the 
most worthwhile [test] is merely to consider what is the trend of productivity….  
Opinions may differ and arguments can rage, but it is indisputable that productivity in the 
industry in the year 1950 is certainly no higher than it was 15 years ago, or 15 years 
before that.‘13  ‗Backwardness‘ might indeed best be assessed historically, for this 
bypasses building‘s ‗peculiarity‘ as an industrial process.  As an objective measure, 
however, it remains heavily constrained by coexistent preoccupations: in post-war 
Britain, for example, that poor productivity was impeding much needed reconstruction, 
which was primarily why the question was raised.  Accepting that social context is central 
to scientific/technical development and diffusion;14 it is equally important to our 
appreciation of ‗backwardness‘, and, especially, to explanations of such shortcomings.  
Here contemporary needs and values, rather than construction‘s past performance, set the 
narrative on which basis the charge-sheet was drawn up and read.15   
On this list are components internalised to stimulate change.  This is true, too, of 
backwardness‘s corrective, modernisation (for both offer judgements on a nominal 
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propensity to resist or welcome innovation).  Addressing building trades unionists in 
1948, one government minister typically offered one such invective contrast between ‗an 
ancient industry‘ with much ‗ancient wisdom‘ but also ‗a lot of ancient prejudice‘, and 
‗scientists [who] have made an immense number of discoveries, have accumulated all 
sorts of data and new practices, not known, not understood, not practised, not even tested 
by the industry.‘16  High on such ‗shopping lists‘ was the diffusion of prefabrication and 
mechanisation.  But this, too, reflected the contemporary pre-occupations of prosecuting 
groups, rather than offering a widely accepted panacea.  Employers, for example, were 
less convinced: believing ‗the supposed contrast between  ―modern‖ practices and 
―traditional‖ methods‘ to be largely ‗spurious … [for] building technique before the war, 
was constantly absorbing new ideas‘ and would continue so to do.17   
The pervasive influence of a contemporary mythology, through which politicians and 
the modern architectural movement combined to made exaggerated claims for associated 
non-traditional building techniques18 as part of a modernisation process, remains 
questionable: particularly because of the widespread, internal resistance to such ideas.19 
Beyond doubt, however, is its omnipresence in advocating a fundamental realignment of 
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construction technique.20  Prefabrication—viewed positively or negatively—became 'the 
question of the moment in building circles' and official discussions.  Transferring housing 
production from the building site to the factory— making construction conform more 
readily to a manufacturing norm—captured the popular imagination: spurred by a 
wartime belief in British technical inventiveness and a ‗romance‘ with American 
prefabricated building methods.21  And central to this combative discourse was the 
deconstruction of the industry‘s traditional and anti-modern shortcomings, deprecating 
bespoke design and crafts based on-site practices as being expensive and intrinsically 
‗backward‘. 
In a broader context, the charge of conservativeness was not uniquely attributed to 
construction; nor did Labour come to government in 1945 lacking an agenda for 
improving business efficiency.22  The Second World War did much to puncture British 
industrial self-confidence, amplifying criticism (particularly American criticism) of 
Britain‘s ‗backwardness‘.  These concerns initially focused on technological deficiencies 
but, from the early 1950s, concentrated on reforming broader aspects of Britain‘s business 
environment and culture, because ‗technical knowledge alone was irrelevant if those in 
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industry remained unable or unwilling to use it.‘23  Yet present, too, in the recent 
historiography is the strong hint that British industrial shortcomings were largely 
illusionary, promulgated by a self-serving and powerful scientific and technological 
lobby.24 
This is not to discount ‗legitimate‘ concerns which, as already noted, were central to 
contemporary understanding. Building productivity had fallen steeply during and 
immediately after the war (on average, by 2.5 per cent p.a. between 1937-51).25  In 1947 it 
still stood some 30 per cent below pre-war levels.  This provided an immediate 
touchstone for judging post-war performance, so that, by default, the inter-war period 
acquired a largely untarnished ‗gold standard‘ reputation for accomplishment.  The 
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Girwood Committee (1948), for example, commended the ‗greater degree of efficiency 
attained by the building industry by 1939 … as compared with the low level in 1914.‘  It 
had ‗shewn itself capable of building houses in large numbers and at a low cost.‘26 Yet, as 
even critics of the industry noted, this was achieved with ‗no more than half a 
horsepower‘ per worker of machinery, compared with ‗2½ horsepower for all 
manufacturing industries‘.  More interestingly still, most authorities pre-war considered 
the organisation and methods of the building industry to be ‗grossly inefficient‘, arguing 
that major cost reductions could have been achieved by the ‗widespread adoption of best-
practice techniques‘.27  
Whether this volumous trans-war fall was related specifically to ‗backwardness‘ 
remains open to conjecture and definition.  Within Mathews‘ et al‘s analysis lies an 
underlying assumption that construction ‗suffered‘ exceptionally from the changed post-
war move to full employment.  This reduced the already marginal war blighted quality of 
the workforce, lessened the tendency to lay off labour in an industry prone to temporary 
disruption, and diminished market disciplines generally.  Noted, too, is the move from 
speculative to public sector work (which reduced incentives to efficiency), and that direct 
government controls—which were omnipresent in construction in the form of building 
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licensing and raw materials allocations—impaired pre-planning.28  Such an evaluation 
closely follows contemporary assessment (for example the Girwood and Working Party 
(1950) reports).   Important also were the political demands placed on construction after 
1945 and consequential tendency to overload within an already ‗fully-employed‘ sector, 
despite the direct controls available.  It was only after the financial crisis of 1947 that the 
stricter application of investment controls over the public and private building sectors, 
more readily marrying output to available resources, had any discernible impact.29  Acute 
factor shortages and consequent continual site disruption resulted in an ‗appalling waste 
of building manpower.‘ ‗Scarcity of building materials since the war‘, the Building 
Working Party concluded, ‗contributed perhaps more than any other single factor to the 
fall in productive efficiency‘.30  
That productivity fluctuated markedly after the war suggests, not only the industry‘s 
responsiveness to such contingencies, but their primacy. For example, Labour 
productivity rose by some ten per cent p.a. on traditional housing contracts mid-dated 
August 1947 to October 1948: ‗as the supply of both materials and labour improved 
considerably‘.  Yet it also fell by four per cent p.a. on contracts dated October1948 to 
December 1949 when, aside from certain goods, there were ‗no real shortages‘.  Such 
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conundrums were explained in catchall terms: notably that there had ‗undoubtedly been a 
great relaxation of effort on the part of building workers‘ (indeed the American 
productivity advantage over Britain in construction was ascribed primarily to the 
'psychological factors' induced by greater individual enterprise, and positive attitudes to 
work and collaboration).31  The overall state of materials supply, therefore, offered no 
‗crystal ball guide‘ to productivity. Nor, perhaps, was this surprising in an industry noted 
for its high dependency on bought in goods and services, where individual shortages set 
project completion rates.32  Indeed, it was always accepted by some advisors that it was 
going to ‗take a long time to make good the loss of morale, the disorganisation, etc. 
brought about by insufficient and irregular supplies‘.33   
At the same time, ‗great variations existed in the labour required on different 
contracts for the same work‘.  This was attributed to the quality of supervision, the 
organisation of the work on site, and the introduction of incentive payments.34  Within 
this parameter, construction management‘s ‗backwardness‘, if such it can be called, was 
differentiated and partial.  Yet industries with above average pre-war rates of 
unemployment, the CEPS observed in 1949, ‗are those which today experience the 
greatest [productivity] difficulties.‘   With high unemployment ‗the employee, especially 
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in building, learns to play ca‘canny and develops generally bad relations with his 
employer.‘  He ‗has always relied …on fear of the sack to get work out of his employee‘ 
and is ‗quite helpless when full employment comes‘.  Although an expanding industry 
before the war, building‘s ‗unemployment record was quite appalling…. a very large part 
of the present sad tale.‘35  Certainly employers perennially complained that the 
‗assurances of full employment have largely discounted‘ that fear which formerly acted as 
a ‗spur to endeavour‘.36  Thus, within an emerging analytical consensus linking 
productivity performance to continual expansion, in ‗an expanding but backward 
[building] industry‘, low productivity was attributed to its previous reliance on ‗high 
unemployment‘, its ‗technical nature [which] …could not be expected to thrive under full 
employment‘, and materials shortages.37   
Certainly pre-war site working conditions were ‗anachronistic‘ alongside modern 
factory provision. Employment was generally casual (frequently by the day for unskilled 
labour) or short-term and seasonal.38  That government induced wartime welfare practices 
were later adopted suggests that the industry was perceived—externally and internally—
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to be behind the times.39  The war also cajoled construction into the ‗modern‘ world in 
other ways: where government, through its package of controls and incentives, 
undermined ‗the principles on which the craft [trade union] organisations had been 
constructed.‘40  Indeed, overall, construction had a ‗bad‘ war, not only because of falling 
productivity, but because the industry felt itself slighted: publicly unacknowledged for its 
self-perceived ‗magnificent achievements‘ and discussed widely only in terms of its 
shortcomings, particularly its ‗clinging to what are called ―traditional‖ practices and 
resisting the introduction of various up-to-date methods‘.41  
 
 
II 
 
‗Backwardness‘ may best be viewed, therefore, as a construct driven by contemporary 
preoccupations and perceptions: illustrated, but not necessarily illuminated, through 
comparisons with past performance and the cross-industry economic contrasts then being 
pioneered.  Such a construct, nonetheless, had a constraining impact—contextually—on 
industrial vitality.  It was also linked causally to an enthused governmental interest in the 
technology and management of construction.  Examples included a new penchant for 
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research into site-based performance so that rational choices could be made between 
competing old and new construction methodologies.42  Other ‗modernising‘ discourses 
could be singularly more impressionistic, or just slanted, so that a large overlap existed 
where partial ‗fact‘ (in both senses of the word) masqueraded as researched truth.   
Construction‘s lack of mechanisation provides an obvious case in point, where 
partial exploration, authorised by a ‗modernising‘ discourse, became a pervasive ‗truth‘ 
signifying innate backwardness.  This held implicitly that low levels of mechanisation 
were prejudicially rooted: as one contemporary enquiry concluded, there existed ‗a strong 
inborn industrial conservativism on both sides, that of the managers and of the men.  
Their mental attitude is such they want the machines to prove to be failures‘, despite other 
joint industrial reports concluding that it was 'vital that British contractors should be 
persuaded of the advantages of more intensive mechanisation'.43  The Department of 
Industrial and Scientific Research thought the ‗building industry suffers from a lack of 
sufficient background of modern technical knowledge to enable it to absorb new ideas 
readily‘.  The slow progress made in introducing mechanical plant ‗was probably of a 
psychological nature since its use is only justified if the output of labour is 
correspondingly increased.‘ But then building was, after all, in a ‗primitive‘ state: where 
‗our unskilled labourers are our machines‘.  Promoting technical progress for its own sake 
was underwritten by the self-serving belief that ‗expenditure on building research brings a 
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good return‘, which would be yet higher if the industry was not so ‗unwilling to learn‘. 44  
Trading in such fixed concepts meant even ‗good news‘—for example, that the number of 
mechanical excavators had increased from two to five thousand within a decade—was 
greeted sceptically by senior Labour politicians because it was sector specific.  As 
Morrison (Lord President and the Minister for Science) read it, the building industry 
remained the ‗least mechanised we have‘, and in its ‗efficiency and outlook‘ it ‗was still 
backward.‘45 
 To counter this the industry faced a barrage of ‗modernising‘ government led 
promotional activity.  The high attendance at plant exhibitions, for example, suggests a 
significant impact in stimulating an active curiosity in new developments.46  There were, 
however, practical difficulties: not the least being that any enthusiasm for substitution 
was undermined because plant was unavailable or subject to heavily extended delivery 
schedules.  Some fifty per cent was also being exported.47  Yet the key question for 
builders was not one of modernisation per se but, contrary to recent speculation, whether 
substitution would reduce costs.  This appreciation was central to the MOW‘s literature, 
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such that it provided detailed costings identifying the operational circumstances under 
which machinery could, or could not, be profitably employed.48   
The Working Party‘s own defensive evaluation was that there was 
 
 no ground for saying that mechanical aids are not in general used in this country so far as they are 
readily available and can be profitably employed.  The expense of the more costly plant can be borne 
only if it is possible to keep the machines in more or less continuous use, and many [smaller] 
contracting firms … have difficulty in providing the necessary sequence of operations to justify the 
initial outlay.  This difficulty is accentuated by interruptions in programmes of work.
49
  
 
This report was not, as we shall see later, welcomed by Labour ministers.  Nevertheless 
its reading was not wholly dissimilar to the government‘s own technical internal 
briefings, albeit that these came from a ‗modernising‘ vantage.  Ministry officials were 
slightly more optimistic about substitutional potential, but noted the ‗doubts in the minds 
of employers as to whether machines do in fact save money, at any rate with present 
labour costs.‘  It was also predicted that, in terms of productivity increases, there was ‗not 
much to be hoped for from more extensive use of machinery.‘50  The one exception was 
the greater use on site of electric hand tools.  Yet this required cheap on-site power of a 
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safe and universal voltage.  The government‘s key Investment Programme Committee, 
however, judged that providing this was ‗not really an economic proposition, and a much 
greater increase in productivity could no doubt be achieved by improving organisation on 
site.‘51     
Thus, as some government agencies acknowledged, the ‗problem was not one of 
trying to overcome organised resistance to the introduction of new methods‘—which had 
been adopted to the ‗fullest possible extent‘—but one of availability, cautiousness and the 
ready diffusion of information.52  The NFBTE, however, emphasised the distinction 
between prudence, and the pervasive suggestion that the industry was unduly 
‗conservative and unprogressive‘.53  In fact, investment in construction was to rise 
consistently through the 1950s and into the 1960s at a historically exceptional rate 
averaging over 6.0 per cent p.a. 54   Nevertheless, judged even by the standard of new 
capital deployed per worker, this still left a ‗backward‘ building industry heavily 
disadvantaged (Table 1). 
Against this ‗cautiousness‘ was placed the investment made by non-traditional 
housing producers seeking new markets because traditional production was limited by 
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resources shortages.55  This was not an insignificant sector.  At its peak in 1948, non-
traditionals accounted for thirty per cent of public sector completions.  Modern movement 
values rested comfortably alongside, and were an integral component of, the 
‗modernising‘ process of greater scientific investigation into construction activity.56  As 
one prominent building economist predicted, now there was ‗some reason for believing 
that at last the building industry has embarked on a more rapid phase its industrial 
revolution…. [That] a genuine revolution in technique is almost bound to take place.‘57  
Contextually, the positive associations of conservativeness  – preserving ‗whatever has 
been tested and found by experience to be good and worthy of retention‘ and exhibiting a 
cautiousness towards untried materials and methods – acquired a dissonant piquancy 
against such assumptions.58  Yet the flowering of a ‗new‘ non-traditional low rise 
technology produced very few designs offering commercial savings over traditional 
methods.59  The expectations of modernists, government and ‗impartial‘ investigators also 
varied markedly, so that no common scale benchmark existed against which 
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‗modernisation‘ as a process could be re-evaluated.  Like ‗backwardness‘, it too existed 
through different contemporary understandings.   
This was ably illustrated in the drive for greater standardisation, being a key agenda 
item in the modernist‘s armoury for industrialising construction.  Promoting 
standardisation was central to the political campaign for greater productivity in all 
industries.  The Anglo-American reports into British productivity differentials thought it 
the most important commercial factor affecting low performance, although employers, by 
and large, were reluctant to implement this.  Yet building employers (albeit as customers) 
welcomed initiatives for the greater standardisation of building components. Likewise, 
the President of the NFBTO thought crafts like plumbing had been ‗revolutionised‘ by the 
influx of standardised parts, and that this should reduce apprenticeship periods.60  
Architectural opinion was more diffuse.  Strong support existed for the manufacture of 
stock prefabricated components upon which all could draw, avoiding any ‗fatal cleavage 
in the trade‘ between non-traditional and traditional builders.61  Modernists tenaciously 
advocated modular co-ordination: locking standardisation, inter-changeability and 
prefabrication together.62  They were particularly disparaging of government for not 
imposing this, despite the acknowledged ‗complexity of the problem‘ and the lack of 
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agreement over which standards and grids to adopt, but instead delegating responsibility 
to a voluntary agency, the British Standards Institute.63  Imposition, anyway, was strongly 
opposed by building and engineering employers, who valued highly the BSI‘s traditional 
autonomy. 64 
Architectural criticism of government laxity also contained an inner irony.  The 
profession‘s self-view reflected its status as building ‗team‘ leaders: which included an 
unwillingness to accept limitations to their design freedom in which economic rationality 
played little part.65  Rhetoric aside, theirs was a position ‗that the minimum amount of 
standardisation consistent with efficiency should be the aim‘.  This was to be aesthetically 
arbitrated by the profession, which lambasted official interference in this context.66 
Balancing manufacturing needs, at a time of acute shortages, even within a cross-
sectional desire not to impose ‗a pauper‘s uniform‘ on construction, was actively hindered 
by an architectural pedantry which opposed wholesale the standardisation of external 
components like doors and windows.  Limiting choice was described by one prominent 
architectural advisor as making ‗impossible in future all those small alterations on which 
good design depends.‘67  Clearly ‗modernisation‘ carried not just different but also 
contradictory, self-selecting meanings within a contemporary vocabulary. 
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The government‘s own appreciation of the achievements made in building 
standardisation was wholly different: where overall the industry occupied a front rank. 
Bevan (Minister of Health), for example, argued that the standardisation of building 
components had made ‗very swift and extensive progress‘ in the post-war years. Greater 
standardisation has been identified as one of the notable areas where the Ministry of 
Supply, particularly, was prepared to use its authority, through its control over 
purchasing, to force the issue of modernisation.68  This impetus found a general 
applicability throughout in modernising construction, where the influence of the 
Ministries of Works and Health held sway.  Indeed, imposition had a wider currency than 
is commonly supposed.  Morrison, before and after his authority for co-ordinating 
economic planning diminished, actively campaigned for the abandonment of voluntarism 
to impose, for example, greater standardisation into British production. These arguments 
were largely rehearsed in the context of government expenditure on construction, and 
ministers‘ predilection for ‗educating‘ local authorities.69  Precedents to standardise local 
authority purchases already existed, but wartime necessity and the anticipated limitations 
of post-war supply, promoted further studies to revise the minima of standards necessary.  
Whereas before 1939 some forty different types and sizes of cast-iron domestic baths 
were available, after the war only four remained.  Of over 500 new British standards 
issued, of which 280 applied to housing, the Ministry of Health instructed that 129 be 
compulsorily applied to local authority work—enforced under the threat of non-payment 
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of the housing subsidy.  Indeed, the ‗principal difficulty‘ preventing ‗making the whole 
280 compulsory‘ was ‗inadequate supplies‘.70   
Within Whitehall and Westminster it was generally accepted that because ‗a great 
deal‘ had already been achieved in construction: ‗the scope for future standardisation‘ 
was ‗not immediately significant.‘ Ministers seemed content to mould commercial 
activity through the aegis of intermediary agencies like local authorities, but were more 
resistant to engaging directly in any compulsory enforcement over private 
manufacturers.71  It is to this aspect that we now turn. 
 
 
III 
 
Labour‘s tripartite ambitions to reorganise consensually the private sector were 
exemplified through its promotion of Development Councils (establishing one 
overarching body for each industry providing common services like R&D, marketing, 
standardisation and training).  Like the Working Parties, these had an employer, employee 
and independent constituent.  Only four were finally established, and these were imposed, 
categorising the ‗failure of Labour‘s hopes to co-operate with industry and thus achieve 
modernization and industrial restructuring‘.  Employer hostility centred on the statutory 
function of the Councils which, they argued, impinged on their right to manage; although 
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they were also perceived as a first step to nationalisation.72  Yet consensual objectives 
broadly conditioned even the limited use of such coercive powers.  Without adopting a 
much modified and greater authoritative stance, imposition—as a response to employer 
resistance—only risked further unco-operativeness from employers.  Under such an 
agenda, too, discriminating between firms (in terms of preferential raw material supply 
for example) would equally have ‗undercut a crucial part of that consensus.‘73 
Building employers were resolutely hostile to the establishment of a Development 
Council, or to any tripartite enquiry.74  That the latter was established was rooted in a 
technocratic discourse linking the industry‘s notoriety for ‗backwardness‘ to its presumed 
incapacity to organise its own technical modernisation.  Yet it also sprang from an 
existing lack of co-ordination in government funded research.  What was required, an 
internal enquiry concluded, was a single representative body from both sides of industry, 
scientists and other parties to provide ‗a bridge between industry and science‘.75 Bitter 
disputes over inter-departmental responsibilities, the autonomy of the independent 
research bodies and employer suspicions over MOW encroachment, rumbled incessantly 
through 1947 without resolution.76  Cumulatively, and as it was viewed internally, this 
forced ministers to ‗face up‘ to the necessity for a broader enquiry into the ‗underlying 
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problem of modernising the building industry and putting pressure on it to become 
technically efficient‘.77   
Unlike most earlier Working Party reports, however, that for construction further 
muddied the waters by opposing the formation of a Development Council.  Ministers did 
not immediately accept this recommendation. They and civil servants always resisted 
delegating policy decisions to tripartite bodies.78  Concurrently, Wilson (President of the 
Board of Trade) was now strongly advocating imposing a Development Council on 
construction (and other industries), all with enhanced powers.  He was also arguing for 
more draconian measures still, including permanent price controls.79 Yet the governing 
wisdom, and previous experience, suggested that government imposition would only 
further ‗prejudice the prospects of the industry taking special steps itself to operate‘ the 
Working Party‘s other modernising recommendations. Ministers thus meandered between 
extremes: from strongly favouring direct political intervention (a response fuelled by past 
disappointments in other industries), to retaining the status quo of compromise and 
negotiation.  Finally, however, ministers accepted that it would be counter-productive 
even to impose a levy on the industry to make it pay for its own research.80  It might 
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initially be concluded, therefore, that consensual values apparently governed policy 
formation in construction, too. 
It is also acknowledged in the literature that precisely ‗what ―modernisation‖ meant 
never clearly emerged‘.81  Nevertheless, although ill-defined, its enunciation in 
construction carried meanings which gave momentum and form to specific areas of 
activity as part of a technological and social impetus.  Morrison, indeed, criticised his 
colleagues for not extolling this message publicly with sufficient energy: ‗to get the 
industry itself to adopt the improvements in building productivity which resulted from 
scientific research‘ and better educational training.82  A reliance on exhortation, by 
argument or appeal, sets an important parameter to the argued for voluntaryist ethos 
underpinning the Attlee government‘s modernisation strategy. Beyond this, the offering 
of inducements, or the compulsion associated with standardisation, took policy-making 
into a separate area of commercial discrimination and enforcement.  
Westminster, of course, had a stronger tradition of imposition over local authorities 
than private industry (although negotiation more readily exemplified central-local 
relations).83  Nevertheless, this provided an already noted optional conduit for government 
led private sector change.  Initially, for example, local authorities were to retain autonomy 
in selecting the type and numbers of permanent non-traditional housing each required. 
Central co-ordination was there only to take ‗full advantage …of the possibilities of mass 
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production and large scale planning‘, and to avoid ‗delays, due to the hesitancy of the 
building industry to adopt new methods‘.84  Indeed, in England and Wales, although not 
in Scotland, the formal imposition of percentage quotas on local authorities was 
consistently rejected.  However, in ways which capture the ambiguities of power and 
imposition within construction‘s modernisation programme, persuasion and education 
were to stretch into areas more consistent with formal direction when results were not 
forthcoming. Local authorities were offered extra quotas, or steel supplies were 
guaranteed, if they took greater numbers of non-traditional houses; while central approval 
for traditional housing could be, and was, deferred.  Moreover, additional direct or hidden 
subsidies consistently underwrote non-traditional production: justified in macro terms 
because they saved labour and scarce materials, but also because they were considered 
‗vital‘ to provide an external ‗stimulus‘ to construction by promoting competition from 
the manufacturing sector and its techniques. Thus, Bevan, argued, ‗a new element will be 
introduced into building which accords more to the general climate of industry.‘85  
Ministers‘ frustration with this ‗very backward and important‘ industry was 
heightened because government was ‗immeasurably‘ its largest customer  
 
enabling it to be fully employed by huge subsidies without which its products would be out of reach of 
the people who need them most.  The Government has also, at great expense, completed research 
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which shows those buildings could be greatly improved and the cost of erecting them cut in terms of 
time, labour and money if a number of quite straightforward changes were made in the organisation 
and methods of the industry….  production seems to lag behind even the low pre-war level and we 
seem unable to persuade the industry to adopt even devices which have been invented, produced, 
tested and proved at the tax-payers‘ expense.86 
 
Morrison‘s chagrin is self-evident.  It found political expression in a number of ways: for 
example, he favoured extending still further the number of British Standards added to the 
compulsory list on publicly-funded work (despite problems with materials supply). 
Bevan, too, wanted to impose wage incentive schemes on all public housing projects. 87  
Most controversial was the proposal to pressurise private ‗contractors employed on 
Government or grant aided work to use more up to date methods.‘  In this enterprise 
Morrison had the full support, initially at least, of his ministerial colleagues on the still 
influential Lord President‘s Committee responsible for co-ordinating domestic policy.  It 
was considered, for example, that coercion might be applied through the form of contract 
and government site inspection. 88  
Yet applying duress necessitated formally giving statutory meaning to the sphere of 
modernisation to be enforced. And here ministers were to be disappointed. Officials 
unanimously concluded that, to cite the Chief Scientific Advisor, it simply was ‗not 
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practicable to define up-to-date methods or to apply pressure on contractors to use 
particular methods.‘ Instead they recommended that progress could best be made through 
the already established educative programme, which was yielding positive, if disparate, 
results (a strategy also given a high priority in other industries).89  A majority of ministers, 
excluding Morrison, concurred.  Nevertheless, two points emerge.  Firstly, that 
throughout the Attlee period, ministers were prepared pragmatically to employ 
compulsion (in its various guises) to enforce modernisation.   Secondly, that 
conceptionally modernisation had an overarching and immediate simplicity which gave it 
vibrant definition, and political character and force.  In this context, that different 
understandings were commonplace was not especially important.  Yet despite being 
categorised (standardisation, mechanisation, direct ministry input on site, etc.), it lacked a 
measurable or ordinal clarity.  As such, even in specific and limited areas, an 
understanding of ‗up-to-date methods‘ acquired the attributes of a moveable feast, which 
not only impaired its evaluation but also its implementation. 
 
 
IV 
 
This ambivalence was reflected in the variable relationships that existed between Labour 
and all external organisations in a modernising, consensual context.  Clarity was also 
blurred for overtly political reasons.  Tiratsoo and Tomlinson, in arguing for a 
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modernising Labour government and a conservative industrial leadership, conclude that: 
‗there can be no doubting the Government‘s resolve to ensure that Working Party 
recommendations were implemented‘, while manufacturers‘ responses were inconsistent 
but less than enthusiastic.90  In construction this singularly not the case.  Here 
ambivalence and selectivity again dominated.  Ministers thought the Building Report 
provided a ‗tendentious and inaccurate account‘, particularly in suggesting that the 
‗inefficiencies of the building industry were due largely to Government policy‘.  Bevan 
went so far as to call for greater political control over future ‗independent‘ enquiries.  
Indeed, he and his colleagues briefly considered blocking its publication, but finally 
sought ways to limit its attendant publicity.91  Certainly its release was delayed until after 
the 1950 general election.  
Yet there was no definitive reading of the Report as being resolutely hostile to 
government policy.  Civil servants thought it made no ‗single spectacular suggestion‘.  
One radical Labour MP noted that its recommendations focused overwhelming on the 
need to improve managerial techniques.  Bowley later used its findings to indict the 
industry for its lack of inter-professional co-operation.92  On the other hand, the NFBTE, 
which had long campaigned against controls, concurred with ministerial assessments that 
‗Government policy … incurs much pertinent criticism‘.  It read the Report as favouring 
‗restoring to the employer the pre-war conditions under which he had space and freedom 
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to conduct his business‘.93  Indeed, an interpretation which highlights the productive 
problems associated with economic management, and especially the maintenance of 
controls, undoubtedly captures one seminal component of contemporary understanding, 
just as it highlights the political imperatives and tensions present.94   
On reflection ministers decided it was expedient ‗not to express public disagreement‘ 
with the Report‘s findings, but instead ‗announce that they were examining its positive 
recommendations‘: effectively to rebuff certain criticisms and reset the agenda.95  Thus, 
ministers and officials set to drafting a future policy for the building industry, 
concentrating on ‗points of detail‘ (controls, architects fees, optimum contracts size and 
training) and direct methods to increase productivity (central materials supply and the 
greater use of incentive schemes).  Why these criteria were included, while others were 
not, has—in part—a mysterious quality.  Notable by its absence was any discussion of the 
need for greater mechanisation.  This ran starkly counter to a public and private 
government discourse, although it coincided with the Working Party conclusions and 
civil service briefings.  Optimum contracts size had likewise already been widely 
discussed elsewhere, but was included to no great gain.  Architectural fees, by contrast, 
formed no part of earlier briefs and was incorporated, one might suppose, largely on a 
political whim. An overtly political agenda was even clearer in the re-examination of 
central bulk purchasing, strongly favoured by the building trades unions and the left, but 
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equally opposed by other parties, and in the pointed rebuttal of Working Party accusations 
that government policy and bureaucracy had impeded productivity gains.96   
Labour‘s review, therefore, was neither comprehensive nor politically impartial.  
This is hardly surprising.  However, in the two key priority areas identified—better 
educational provision and the introduction of incentives—ministers‘ dealings with 
external bodies proved to be noticeably varied and ‗flexible‘, and certainly not tenacious 
as a matter of policy.  In the case of neither was this because of already pristine 
compliance.  Indeed, the Minister of Education thought that construction needed to be 
‗awakened to the need for technically trained personnel‘.97  Yet, while some ministers 
commended the industry for its eagerness to employ those with higher qualifications, 
other colleagues and civil servants, argued against coercing a university sector wholly 
opposed to offering studies in building exactly because construction failed to offer ‗good 
prospects for trained men‘. Paradoxically, underpinning this statement on industrial 
backwardness was an entrenched belief that technical training ‗was not a suitable subject 
for a first-degree course‘. Consequentially, opinion remained heavily divided over the 
limits of pressure that should be applied to secure the co-operation of the universities and 
little was done.  There was noticeably less division or hesitancy when seeking to rectify 
trades union inflexibility towards dual-craft or adult training (although the employers also 
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opposed this); indeed it is clear that ministers thought in terms of setting no limit to the 
degree of coercion they were willing to apply to the unions to reverse their opposition.98 
A temporary incentives scheme had been introduced by the MOW during wartime to 
combat falling productivity.  Here it was appreciated that success depended on the ‗co-
operation and enthusiasm of both employers and operatives.‘99  This was seldom evident. 
The unions ‗strenuously opposed‘ the imposition of bonus payments, and did so again 
immediately after 1945, despite the wage reductions resulting.   They held that bonus 
systems were divisive and discouraged ‗true craftsmanship‘ (although the ‗a heavy 
majority‘ of the membership favoured payment by results).100  Employers as a body were 
also split. By 1947 the NFBTE was urging that ‗the future of the industry depended to a 
large extent on the success‘ of this experiment, but smaller contractors were ‗afraid of 
unfair competition‘ from the larger firms because they lacked the costing systems needed 
to operate bonusing.101 
Ministers and officials saw incentives as one further cure-all for poor productivity. 
Most, however, opposed intervening strategically with free collective bargaining.102 Yet 
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behind the scenes ministers actively sought change by any means.  Continuing opposition 
from the industry prompted Bevan to threaten to cancel future housing work: 
 
 The cost of building is already so high that it ought not to be allowed to go any higher….  strong 
pressure should be brought to bear on both employers and operatives to secure the acceptance of an 
‗incentives‘ scheme.  If my colleagues agree I would like the industry to be told that the Government 
insist that such a scheme must be adopted...
 103
   
 
That agreement was eventually reached rested significantly on ministerial contrivances 
with the TUC and employers‘ organisations to impress on all parties that a wage increase 
not linked to productivity would be ‗highly undesirable‘.104  
So sensitive was the incentives‘ issue that ministers tempered further controversy by 
delaying consideration of an already mooted Working Party enquiry.105  Union opposition 
also turned on a broader loyalty: where incentives were proposed as ‗vital for the 
fulfilment of various [social] programmes by the Government‘.  Yet increased 
productivity raised the spectre of a return to large-scale unemployment.  The unions 
requested, therefore, that ‗sufficient material supply‘ would be provided to assure 
‗continuity of work on the assumption of a 20 per cent increase in productivity.‘ These 
were guarantees that the government, as the financial crisis of 1947 unfolded, was 
singularly unwilling and unable to offer.106   
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Yet these were not transitory anxieties.  As ministers later acknowledged, ‗the most 
serious obstacle‘ to the diffusion of incentive payments was ‗the fear of employers and 
employees that by increasing their rate of production they may work themselves out of a 
job.‘107  To counter this, the Minister of Works, supported by other ministers reviewing 
building policy, proposed expanding the building programme to account for productivity 
increases—in effect, offering a psychological incentive.  This initiative met a firm rebuff 
from the Chancellor‘s CEPS advisors.   Unless the size of the building workforce was 
reduced, it was argued, incentive-induced programmes only added to total investment 
costs if labour remained constantly employed. Incentive schemes, moreover, were by their 
very nature inflationary because a high proportion of the costs ‗saved‘ were passed 
directly to the workforce.108  Approval was, therefore, deferred pending a Treasury 
review.  This reported unfavourably on the building material supply position.109  
Ultimately, therefore, measures to promote incentives, which ministers and the Working 
Party alike thought ‗imperative ... if output in the industry is to be adequately increased‘, 
were supplanted by macro considerations.110  Yet it was a decision determined more by 
the concurrent abnormal circumstances imposed by the outbreak of the Korean war than 
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by doctrinal intransigence.  In fact, public investment in housing and construction fell in 
1951, as did building productivity.  
 
 
IV 
 
Officials researching into future policy for the building industry in 1950 concluded that: 
 
 The fact of the matter is that there is no single obvious short cut to higher productivity and lower 
costs.  There are, however, a number of measures that can be taken, each of them looking perhaps 
relatively small by themselves, but in the aggregate able to produce substantial improvements.
111
   
 
The contrast with the rhetoric of modernisation—which headlined mechanisation, 
scientific diffusion and incentives—and its programmatic function—driving forward 
change through pejorative or alluring comparisons—is obvious. Clearly a generalised call 
for small, incremental improvements would have been no campaign at all.  Yet the 
hyperbole which exemplified modernisation as a political process also gave added 
contemporary meaning to the industry‘s limitations.  Fundamentally, however, 
‗backwardness‘ and ‗modernisation‘ derived their understandings contextually from the 
growing productivity conflict between needs and capacity in the industrially dislocated 
post-war period, where the ‗politics of progress‘ acquired a resonant piquancy.  Under 
such pressures, politicians, and their technical and scientific advisors, specified 
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construction‘s ills by drawing too readily on inappropriate comparisons between building 
and manufacturing. Indeed the very language and specifics of modernisation lacked 
clarity, so that perceptions and predilections frequently governed. This aided misdirection 
and impaired implementation.  All, too, were prone to self-serving diagnoses and ‗eye-
catching‘ remedies, so that ‗objective‘ measurement acquired an ambiguous, portable 
quality.  This occurred at a time when ‗new‘ non-traditional methods, representing but 
one expression of the contemporary preoccupations with technological solutions, offered 
an alluring bridge between the factory and building site.   
Yet the alleged conservatism of builders had contradictory faces.  The MOW, for 
example, which monitored the industry closely, noted builders‘ doubts as to the 
profitability of substituting plant for human labour. It, too, had reservations about the 
gains available.  Yet it also reported that there was less a lack of interest by builders in 
new developments, than a shortage of machinery, and a pervading belief that a lack of  
working continuity would undercut its profitable deployment (just as the union‘s feared 
that materials shortages bespoke future unemployment).  Mechanisation for its own sake, 
like much on the moderniser‘s agenda, remained a self-transferred and false expectation.  
In summarising the industry‘s progress by 1959, against continuing charges of 
backwardness, the BRS reflected that: 
 
The degree of mechanisation of building constructional processes which has been achieved may not be 
great; it is certainly not enough for those of us who are impatient for a higher rate of application; … 
but the industry is developing an awareness of the potential value of utilizing the facilities offered by 
this mechanical age.
112
   
 
Social and scientific values thus continued to set the agenda for yet another phase in 
industrialising construction.113 
Indeed a strong belief – coexistent in government and Whitehall – that substantial 
improvement was possible had always been omnipresent (captured even in the two 
otherwise prosaic commentaries above).  Given the high fall in productivity across the 
trans-war period, this was neither a surprising nor wholly unrealistic expectation. 
Continuing under-performance spurred the Attlee governments further beyond a 
consensually orientated agenda into the realms of pressured consent and compulsion.  
Yet, importantly, this proclivity was already present: for example, in the forced 
standardisation for public housing schemes and in the discriminatory practices by 
government and Whitehall when favouring ‗modern‘ non-traditional producers.   
Distorting the market against traditional builders undermined the pretence of modernising 
by consent (although compulsion could be disguised under the cloak of necessity because 
of factor shortages). It is equally apparent that even in construction, where government 
and its agents had greater levers over the private sector than elsewhere, in ministers‘ 
resolution to act a disparity existed between external agencies in terms of the frequency 
and degree of coercion applied.  Moreover, if intention is the judge, then, although 
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heavily restrained by circumstance and practicality, ultimately Labour set fewer limits 
still on the coercive methods it was prepared to employ. But then so important was 
building productivity that ministers were prepared finally to set aside even inflationary 
considerations in favour of promoting growth.  Modernisation, as a corrective to 
backwardness, can thus be best be understood, and measured, as being a forceful political 
elixir applied to remedy a perceived socio-economic malaise (signified contextually by 
industrial conservativeness, technological deficiency, etc.) deemed to be impairing 
national or sector potential.  This was the reality.  Yet, as with all perceptions, and all 
measures of potential, the ambiguities of illusion and delusion are, and were, every 
present to deceive. 
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